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SUMMARY
With reports of hospital-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) continuing
to increase and therapeutic options decrease, infection control methods are of increasing
importance. Here we investigate the relationship between surveillance and infection control.
Surveillance plays two roles with respect to control : it allows detection of infected/colonized
individuals necessary for their removal from the general population, and it allows quantiﬁcation
of control success. We develop a stochastic model of MRSA transmission dynamics exploring the
eﬀects of two screening strategies in an epidemic setting: random and on admission. We consider
both hospital and community populations and include control and surveillance in a single
framework. Random screening was more eﬃcient at hospital surveillance and allowed nosocomial
control, which also prevented epidemic behaviour in the community. Therefore, random
screening was the more eﬀective control strategy for both the hospital and community
populations in this setting. Surveillance strategies have signiﬁcant impact on both ascertainment
of infection prevalence and its control.
INTRODUCTION
The development of antimicrobial resistance in many
nosocomial pathogens poses a serious threat to public
health. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) presents a particular problem with the ma-
jority of English acute NHS Trusts being aﬀected [1]
and the number of isolate reports increasing [2].
With therapeutic options scarce, and becoming
scarcer, infection control methods are becoming in-
creasingly important with a focus on providing pre-
ventative rather than reactive measures. However,
studies on control measures are limited [3] and evi-
dence for their eﬀectiveness sparse and often contra-
dictory [4]. Current guidelines are based on medical
and scientiﬁc rationale and suggestive evidence rather
than study results [4]. However, with infection rates
relentlessly increasing, old guidelines have become
unfeasible and impractical to perform and now ﬂex-
ible, targeted approaches tend to be favoured [5]. As a
consequence strategies are not uniformly applied and
vary from hospital to hospital.
As infection is almost invariably acquired by
transmission (particularly via the hands of health-care
workers) rather than developing de novo, eﬀective
infection control is usually brought about by pre-
venting spread. There are two basic approaches: uni-
versal and targeted. Universal approaches, such as
increasing hand hygiene, aim to reduce the trans-
mission opportunities between patients, but are not
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speciﬁcally aimed at patients known to be infectious.
If they can be implemented to such an extent that each
infectious patient produces (on average) less than
one other infectious patient, then this intervention
alone is suﬃcient to control infection within the
hospital. In contrast targeted approaches rely on
identiﬁcation of infectious cases through surveillance,
and taking steps to reduce their infectiousness from
the point of detection (we term these steps ‘ iso-
lation’). Detecting MRSA in routine clinical samples
has been shown to be inadequate and epidemiological
surveillance allowing identiﬁcation and treatment of
carriers is crucial to epidemic control and reduction
in infection numbers [6–9]. The implementation of
detection and isolation programmes remains contro-
versial due to uncertainty over eﬃcacy coupled with
the inherent costs and disruption involved, as well as
limited isolation resources.
In addition to allowing targeted control, surveil-
lance of infection (i.e. detection) plays an important
role in measuring the magnitude of the problem,
determining the penetrance of antibiotic resistance
[e.g. vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(VRSA)] and determining the eﬀectiveness of control.
Consequently, control of infection by detection and
isolation is not independent of surveillance. In this
paper we address this relationship between surveil-
lance and control.
Mathematical modelling
Mathematical models provide a way of testing control
strategies theoretically prior to their implementation,
and give an indication of factors which may lead to
control success/failure.
Models of infectious disease transmission dynamics
commonly fall into one of two categories : determin-
istic or stochastic. Deterministic models use diﬀer-
ential equations to approximate the mean behaviour
from initial conditions. Whereas stochastic models
deﬁne movements of individuals to be chance events
occurring at random time-intervals determined by the
model parameters, meaning the outcome may be dif-
ferent for diﬀerent simulation runs. There have been a
number of previous models looking speciﬁcally at
nosocomial infection transmission dynamics [10–19].
This work builds on those studies, particularly those
by Cooper et al. [4, 18, 19] which use stochastic
models to explore the spread of nosocomial patho-
gens. The novel aspect of this work, however, is
that we model transmission between a hospital and
community and within this setting include both con-
trol (by isolation) as well as active surveillance, in a
single framework.
In particular we address questions relating to sur-
veillance and control of MRSA in an epidemic setting
through two screening strategies : random and on ad-
mission. The overall objective was to develop a simple
stochastic model of MRSA transmission dynamics to
explore the eﬀects of the diﬀerent screening strategies
upon MRSA control, taking into consideration the
eﬀect of both the hospital and community popu-
lations.
In the ﬁrst section we deﬁne the model structure
and underlying assumptions, including some simple
analytical results. We then use the model to produce
some numerical simulations, initially presenting a
simple comparison of the two screening strategies in
terms of numbers detected, and then consider the level
of eﬀort put into each strategy (i.e. numbers screened
per day). To examine the relationship between sur-
veillance and control, we consider the implementation
of isolation once positive patients are identiﬁed and
therefore determine how the eﬀectiveness of detection
for each strategy translates to the eﬀectiveness of
control.
METHODS
Description of model framework
The framework is based closely on Cooper et al.
[4, 19]. Brieﬂy, we model a closed population con-
sisting of both a ﬁxed-size hospital and the com-
munity it serves. Individuals in both the hospital and
community populations are categorized as either
MRSA-positive and infectious (either infected or
colonized) or MRSA-negative and susceptible to
infection (for brevity referred to as infected and
susceptible respectively from now on).
Infected in-patients are classiﬁed into one of three
groups: isolated (ISO), detected but not isolated
(DNISO) or undetected infected (UIH). Isolated
patients are those known to be MRSA-positive
and consequently placed in an isolation facility ;
detected not isolated patients are those known to be
positive but who cannot be isolated; and undetected
infected patients are those not known to be infectious.
By isolation, we consider any mechanism by which
patients are eﬀectively isolated in terms of trans-
mission; this might include speciﬁc facilities (e.g. an
isolation ward) or staﬀ (e.g. cohort nursing). For
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convenience, we use isolation ward (IW) as the
abbreviation for this facility. The key assumptions
are that isolation is perfect (i.e. transmission from
isolation never occurs) and it is limited (i.e. there is a
ﬁxed capacity in terms of the numbers of patients that
can be isolated at any one time, given by NISO).
Infected patients are detected, and isolated if capacity
is available (if the ﬁxed capacity of IW not reached),
and marked DNISO otherwise. Thus, observed
(apparent) hospital prevalence of infection (i.e. those
picked up by screening) is ISO+DNISO, whereas the
actual (real) prevalence is ISO+DNISO+UIH.
Under the assumption of 100% bed occupancy,
patients discharged from hospital are immediately
replaced by an individual from the community, with
the rate of discharge being assumed equal for all
hospital subgroups (i.e. regardless of infection status).
The community population is also split into sub-
groups, each with a diﬀerent readmission rate.
Discharged patients at ﬁrst enter the group with a
high readmission rate (C1) from where, if they are not
readmitted, they move at a set rate to the second
community group (C2) with a lower readmission rate
[4]. The number of susceptible and infected in-
dividuals in C1 and C2 are denoted SC1, IC1, SC2 and IC2
respectively.
Transmission is assumed to be within the hospital
only, meaning the dynamics are hospital driven. The
rate of infection of susceptible patients is determined
by the proportion of UIH and DNISO patients, i.e.
isolated patients do not contribute to infection, and
for simplicity it is assumed that UIH and DNISO
patients are equally infectious. Homogeneity is
assumed within the susceptible population with all
individuals having an equal chance of becoming
infected. For simplicity, recovery of infected patients
is assumed to occur at an equal rate for all infected
groups in both the hospital and community and
isolated patients were assumed not to recover but
to be discharged infected. However, the eﬀects of
eradication therapy may mean that in fact the recov-
ery rate for known infected (and therefore treated)
patients would be greater than for untreated patients
(i.e. undetected infected and infecteds in the com-
munity). Additionally, homogeneity of MRSA is
assumed in terms of both transmissibility and detect-
ability.
Within this setting we consider two screening stra-
tegies : random and on admission. Both strategies
are assumed to be 100% accurate and the eﬀects of
sensitivity and speciﬁcity are not included explicitly,
although their eﬀects can be included in the model
parameters.
Random screening allows patients to enter the
hospital unscreened as either susceptible (SH) or
undetected infected (UIH). Routine random screening
then occurs at a set rate (w), so that each patient
is screened at an average interval of 1/w. Detected
infections are moved into the IW. If the IW is at
capacity then these detected patients are DNISO
and have priority to move into IW when space
becomes available, i.e. when an isolated patient is
discharged.
The on-admission screening strategy screens a pro-
portion (v) of patients on entry to the hospital so
detected infected individuals are placed directly in
isolation and cannot infect. Again, if the IW is at
capacity then detected infected patients become
DNISO. Note that a proportion (1 – v) of admissions
are unscreened and join SH or UIH appropriately,
where they will remain unscreened for the duration of
their stay.
To allow eﬀective comparison between the two
strategies the numbers of patients screened per day
were set to be equal. The number screened at random
is wN per day (where N is hospital capacity) and the
admission rate is mN per day (where 1/m is average
length of stay) so that the numbers screened on
admission per day are vmN. For the screening eﬀort
to be equal :
w=vm:
Schematic diagrams of the two screening strategies
are presented in Figure 1, although the model frame-
work allows both strategies to be included simul-
taneously. Parameter values are in accordance with
previous work by Cooper et al. [4], and are given in
Table 1.
The model proceeds as a stochastic, iterative pro-
cess with successive events performed after random
time-intervals (drawn from a negative exponential
distribution with the rate given by the total rate of
events) and events occurring to whole individuals.
This stochastic nature of the model is essential for
the simulation of dynamics of hospital infections,
where random events have the potential to greatly
inﬂuence outbreak behaviour [18]. Unlike all other
events, the movement of susceptible individuals
from C1 toC2 is assumed to be deterministic due to the
large numbers of individuals involved. All stochastic
events and their corresponding rates are listed in
Table 2.
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The model was written and run in MATLAB1
(MatLab, The MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) on a
personal computer.
Analytical results
The transmissibility of the infection is considered in
terms of the basic reproduction number (R0), deﬁned
as the average number of secondary cases caused
by one primary case in a completely susceptible
population. For models explicitly including the com-
munity, there are two components to R0 : a within-
hospital value (r0) and a term to include the possibility
of multiple returns to hospital [19]. The within-
hospital reproduction number in the absence of
intervention, given by
r0=
b
m+c
,
considers only the number of secondary cases arising
from a single admission. The overall R0 considers the
number of secondary cases caused by a single visit and
the mean number of visits per patient, while they are
still infected [4]. If P is the probability that an infected
patient is discharged and readmitted while still in-
fected (in the absence of control), then 1/(1 – P) is the
mean number of infected visits, so that
R0=r0
1
1xP
,
where
P=
mh1(h2+c)+mdh2
(h1+c+d)(h2+c)
:
Therefore R0 can be expressed as
R0=
b(h1+c+d)(h2+c)
(m+c)((h1+c+d)(h2+c)xmh1(h2+c)xmdh2)
:
Including control by isolation (but not any con-
straint on isolation capacity) has diﬀering impact de-
pending on the screening strategy adopted. Random
screening has the eﬀect of curtailing the period of time
over which infected individuals can transmit (i.e. they
are removed from general circulation). If r00 is the
within-hospital reproduction number with random
screening, then
r00=
b
m+c+w
:
Whereas, when patients are screened on admission,
the eﬀect is to reduce P to Pk where Pk=(1 – v)P.
The value for r0 (within-hospital) was taken from
the study by Cooper et al. [4] and set at 1.27 and
the value of P was calculated to be 0.037 using the
parameter values shown in Table 1 (taken from
the same study), these parameters give an overall R0
value of 1.32.
We solve the model numerically for diﬀerent par-
ameter values, concentrating on the combined eﬀects
of the amount of eﬀort put into each strategy (w and
v) and the capacity of the IW. The outcome variables
of interest are the apparent and real infection preva-
lences in the hospital and community (i.e. surveillance
and control success).
RESULTS
Surveillance of epidemic (no control)
Initially we consider the eﬀect of the two surveillance
strategies in the absence of any control during an
(a)
SH UIH SC1
SC2
IC1
IC2
ISO
DNISO
Hospital Community
(b)
SH UIH SC1
SC2
IC1
IC2
ISO
DNISO
Hospital Community
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the model for both screening
strategies. See text for symbol deﬁnitions. The bold lines
indicate the screening process. (a) Random screening ;
(b) on-admission screening.
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Table 2. Events in model and their rates
Event description Event rate Event
Infection of a susceptible within the hospital bSH (UIH+DNISO) SHpUIH
Recovery of an undetected infected within the hospital cUIH UIHpSH
Detection of an undetected infected in
the hospital (i.e. by random screening)*
wUIH UIHpISO# UIHpDNISO#
Recovery of a DNISO cDNISO DNISOpSH
Discharge of an isolated patient
(and their replacement by a DNISO)*
mISO ISOpIC1 and DNISOpISO$
DNISO discharged* mDNISO DNISOpIC1
Susceptible discharged* mSH SHpSC1
Undetected infected discharged* mUIH UIHpIC1
Admission of susceptible from community group 1
C1h1
C1h1+C2h2
SC1
SC1+IC1
SC1pSH
Admission of susceptible from community group 2
C2h2
C1h1+C2h2
SC2
SC2+IC2
SC2pSH
Admission of infected from community group 1;
unscreened
1xv
C1h1
C1h1+C2h2
IC1
SC1+IC1
IC1pUIH
Admission of infected from community group 1;
screened and detected
v
C1h1
C1h1+C2h2
IC1
SC1+IC1
IC1pISO# IC1pDNISO#
Admission of infected from community group 2 –
unscreened
1xv
C2h2
C1h1+C2h2
IC2
SC2+IC2
IC2pUIH
Admission of infected from community group 2 –
screened and detected
v
C2h2
C1h1+C2h2
IC2
SC2+IC2
IC2pISO# IC2pDNISO#
Movement of an infected from community group
1 to community group 2
dIC1 IC1pIC2
Recovery of an infected in community group 1 cIC1 IC1pSC1
Recovery of an infected in community group 2 cIC2 IC2pSC2
* Each discharge event/movement into IW is associated with an admission event (of either a susceptible or infected indi-
vidual from one of the two community groups).
# The event depends on the state of the isolation facility. If capacity is not reached then movement into ISO occurs. If
capacity is reached then movement into DNISO occurs.
$ This event can only occur given that at least one DNISO patients exists.
Table 1. Parameter values used in the model
Parameter Symbol Value Reference
Transmission coeﬃcient b 0.1622 Deﬁned by other parameters
to set value of R0
Discharge/admission rate (dayx1) m 0.125 Cooper et al. [4]
Recovery rate (dayx1) c 0.0027 Cooper et al. [4]
Random screening rate w Range: 0.0075–0.125 —
Admission screening rate v Range: 0.06–1 —
Readmission rate – community group 1 h1 0.0057 Cooper et al. [4]
Readmission rate – community group 2 h2 0.00063 Cooper et al. [4]
Decay rate from community group 1 to 2 d 0.03 Cooper et al. [4]
Community group 1 population size C1 Range: 3.3263r103 to 3.5014r103 Deﬁned by other parameters
Community group 2 population size C2 Range: 1.584r105 to 1.6673r105 Deﬁned by other parameters
Overall community population size C Range: 1.6172r105 to 1.70236r105 Deﬁned by other parameters :
C1+C2
Isolation ward capacity NISO Range: 0–50 —
Hospital population size N 1000–NISO —
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epidemic (i.e. from the introduction to endemic state).
Figure 2(a,b) shows 10 epidemic simulations in terms
of the real number of infections in the hospital and
community. With the chosen parameters the preva-
lence in the hospital and community reach approxi-
mately 400/1000 and 14000/170 234 respectively. The
apparent number in the hospital (i.e. those detected
through active surveillance) is shown for the two
screening strategies : random (Fig. 2c) and on ad-
mission (Fig. 2d). There are two features to note.
First, random screening is more eﬃcient in that more
infected individuals are detected (the equilibrium
value isy160 as opposed toy80). Second, the pattern
of timing of detection with random screening closely
follows the pattern of the overall hospital prevalence,
whereas detection with screening on admission fol-
lows the community prevalence pattern, which is
slower with a pronounced lag of about half a year.
The relationship between real and apparent preva-
lence for one epidemic further highlights diﬀerences
between the two strategies (Fig. 3). For random
screening, the apparent prevalence reﬂects the real
prevalence within the hospital, i.e. there is a linear
relationship so that a doubling in real hospital
prevalence gives a proportional increase in the num-
ber detected (Fig. 3a). Surveillance eﬃciency is the
slope of the relationship, so that, for example with
w=1/8 days, y50% of all infections in the hospital
are detected (200 vs. 400). However, the same re-
lationship is not seen between apparent and real
prevalence in the community (Fig. 3b). There is an
initial linear relationship between real and apparent
prevalence, but once the real community prevalence
reaches a threshold level (between 1000 and 2000
infected individuals), and the epidemic takes oﬀ in
the community, further increases in community
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Fig. 2.Results of 10 simulations with no control over 1800 days (y5 years) : (a) real hospital prevalence including both known
and unknown infected individuals ; (b) real community prevalence ; (c) apparent hospital prevalence under random screening ;
and (d) apparent hospital prevalence under screening on admission. Note the diﬀerent vertical scales. Screening parameter
values are w=0.087 and v=0.7 (such that 70% of the admissions/day are screened). All other parameters are set to the
values in Table 1.
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prevalence make very little diﬀerence to the numbers
detected by random screening in the hospital. For
example, for w=1/16 days, for all community preva-
lence values between approximately 2000 and 9000
the corresponding apparent prevalence results are
within the narrow range of around 80–140. However,
increasing the detection eﬀort results in increased ef-
ﬁciency and more sensitive results (the relationship is
more linear).
Screening on admission provides less eﬀective de-
tection overall (note the diﬀerence in horizontal
scales). This strategy underestimates hospital infec-
tion at low prevalence levels (during the early stages
of the epidemic), although the relationship becomes
more linear once infection levels become suﬃciently
high (a threshold level of y250) (Fig. 3c), especially
with increased eﬀort (measured as the proportion
screened on admission, v). In contrast to random
screening, on-admission screening reveals a linear re-
lationship between real and apparent community
prevalence meaning the apparent prevalence more
accurately reﬂects the real prevalence throughout the
epidemic. The eﬃciency of this is increased with in-
creasing screening eﬀort (i.e. the slope of the re-
lationship decreases with an increase in eﬀort). Note
that for both strategies the hospital prevalence
reaches an endemic state at the end of the simulation
(the points are clumped together).
In terms of surveillance, screening on admission
clearly provides a better approach to estimating
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Fig. 3.Real and apparent prevalence for diﬀerent surveillance eﬀort levels over a single epidemic. Lines join adjacent points 7
days apart during the epidemic, the total duration of observations=1800 days (y5 years). Panels (a) and (b) display results
for random screening with three w values :$=1/8 days ;%=1/16 days ;r=1/133 days. Panels (c) and (d) display results for
screening on admission for three corresponding values of v : $=1; %=0.6 ; r=0.06. Parameters are set to the values in
Table 1.
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community prevalence than screening in-patients at
random. However, screening on admission provides
much more limited information on hospital preva-
lence, which is better estimated by randomly screen-
ing in-patients.
Control of epidemic
Upon introduction of a control measure the values for
r0, P and R0 are altered dependent on screening eﬀort.
The corrected r0, P and R0 values are 0.76, 0.037 and
0.79 for a random screening eﬀort of w=0.087 and
1.27, 0.011 and 1.28 for an on-admission screening
eﬀort of v=0.7 (eﬀort values correspond to those in
Fig. 4).
Figure 4 shows 10 simulations under each screen-
ing strategy when a control measure is present, in
this case an IW with capacity of 20 patients so that
the detection of individuals serves an additional
purpose: it allows them to be isolated, in the expec-
tation of preventing transmission and, hence, an
epidemic. The two strategies show very diﬀerent
dynamics.
Random screening gives the greatest control ; both
hospital and community prevalence is lower than for
on-admission screening [cf. panels (a) vs. (b) and (g)
vs. (h) in Fig. 4]. The number of infected individuals in
the hospital appears to increase very gradually
throughout the simulation period under random
screening. One of the simulations begins to show epi-
demic behaviour at the end of the period, but for most
simulations the number of infected individuals re-
mains below 50 with only small-scale ﬂuctuations.
The capacity of the IW (NISO=20) is generally
adequate with most detected individuals being able to
be placed under control and IW overﬂow occurring
infrequently (Fig. 4c, e). The community prevalence
also gradually increases over time (Fig. 4g). For most
simulations (excepting the one exhibiting epidemic
behaviour) the maximum is y800 by the end of the
simulation period.
Overall, random screening appears to exhibit con-
trol but with gradually increasing numbers of infected
individuals causing control capability to be increas-
ingly stretched and IW overﬂow and epidemic be-
haviour increasingly likely.
Screening on admission allows epidemics within
the hospital which take oﬀ rapidly and remain un-
controlled; the endemic state that develops has an
equilibrium value of y300 infected individuals
(Fig. 4b). Corresponding with the hospital epidemic
the IW quickly reaches and remains at its capacity
of 20 patients and subsequently overﬂows (Fig. 4d).
The number of DNISO patients more steadily
increases up to an equilibrium of y60 (Fig. 4f ).
The community prevalence levels show a slower
epidemic pattern than that in the hospital, reaching
nearly 14 000 infected individuals at equilibrium
(Fig. 4h).
Overall, on-admission screening does not control
MRSA under the chosen parameter values. The
epidemics in all simulations take oﬀ quickly causing
the IW to become overwhelmed, in turn leading to a
build up of known positive patients who cannot be
isolated.
Surveillance and control
Figure 5 explores the relationship between surveil-
lance and control, looking at the eﬀect of surveillance
eﬀort (w and v) in terms of number of infections/
detections summed over the simulation period
(1800 days) given diﬀerent control capabilities (i.e. IW
sizes).
Under random screening the average number of
infections in the simulation period can be seen to de-
crease with increasing screening eﬀort (Fig. 5a). The
eﬀect of increasing IW capacity is to reduce the level
of eﬀort required to achieve the same result, e.g. to
achieve a fall to 15 000 infections per simulation per-
iod a detection eﬀort of wB0.06 is required when the
IW capacity is 50, compared to a detection eﬀort of
wB0.09 when the IW capacity is 10.
The results for screening on admission show a dif-
ferent picture (Fig. 5b) ; the average number of infec-
tions during the simulation period remains high until
>80% of admissions are successfully screened.
Larger IW sizes correspond to slightly fewer infection
events but have relatively little eﬀect, i.e. the con-
straint is the detection.
The number of detections over the simulation per-
iod for both policies is peaked with a single maximum.
The initial increase is caused by the fact that as
screening eﬀort increases then so does the ability to
detect infected individuals. However, the steady de-
cline in numbers of detections that follow the peak is
due to the fact that detection enables eﬀective control.
Therefore, there are fewer individuals available to be
detected, leading to fewer detection events. For ran-
dom screening an increase in IW capacity causes the
peak to be reached at lower eﬀort levels and with
lower numbers of detections meaning that detection is
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(a)  Random screening: undetected infecteds in the hospital
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(b)  On-admission screening: undetected infecteds in the hospital
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( f )  On-admission screening: detected but unisolated patients
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Fig. 4. Simulations of 10 epidemics over 1800 days (y5 years) with an IW of capacity 20. Random screening (w=0.087) is
shown in the left hand panels and on-admission screening (v=0.7) on the right. The four rows examine: hospital prevalence ;
number of patients in IW, number of DNISO patients and community prevalence. All other parameters are set to the values
in Table 1.
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eﬃcient and isolation capacity is a constraint for
control success.
For on-admission screening, the average number of
detections over the simulation period (Fig. 5d ) in-
creases linearly with detection eﬀort, up to 80%
screening. Detection eﬀort values over this give a de-
creasing number of detection events, corresponding
to the control seen after this eﬀort level (Fig. 5b),
i.e. once control occurs there are fewer infected
individuals to detect. The peak in the number of
detections occurs at a much higher eﬀort level for
on-admission screening (Fig. 5d) than for random
screening (Fig. 5c), meaning that random screening is
more eﬃcient, i.e. less detection eﬀort is required for
successful control.
Results in terms of R0
These results can be explained by considering overall
and within-hospital R0 values given diﬀerent levels of
surveillance eﬀort for each strategy. Figure 6 shows a
diagrammatic representation of R0 values and com-
pares both the within-hospital r0 and the overall R0
(which includes both the hospital and community by
considering R0 over multiple visits) for the two
screening strategies.
Upon an increase in surveillance eﬀort, random
screening gives a decrease in within-hospital r0 and the
overall R0 value decreases at the same rate. Random
screening has no eﬀect on the readmission of com-
munity infection. The decrease in the overall R0 is
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Fig. 5.Relationship between screening and control for random screening (a, c) and on-admission screening (b, d). Panels show
the average number of infection events (a, b) and detection events (c, d) over a simulation period (y5 years) from 10 simu-
lations (note that the scale for (a) and (b) ranges from 0 to 35 000 infections). The epidemics were run with diﬀerent IW sizes :
%=10;$=20;#=50. All other parameters are set to the values in Table 1.
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simply due to the hospital r0 eﬀects. Conversely,
screening on admission has no eﬀect at all on the
within-hospital r0 and the decrease in the overall R0
corresponds only to the decrease in infectious read-
missions from the community (P).
Figure 6 shows that for on-admission screening
the overall R0 can never be brought below the within-
hospital r0, meaning that using these parameter
values, with an r0>1 (r0=1.27), on-admission
screening will never be able to control MRSA even
at 100% screening (i.e. v=1). However, in Figure 5
on-admission screening at v=1 allows control. This
is due to the assumption that at v=1, 100% of
admitted patients are screened and all of these screens
eﬀective. As all infected individuals are assumed to be
in the community population initially, 100% eﬀective
screening will prevent any infectious individuals ever
entering the hospital, i.e. the screening barrier is never
breached. Therefore, despite the within-hospital r0
being >1 no infectious individuals are ever actually
present within the hospital to transmit MRSA.
DISCUSSION
We believe that this is the ﬁrst attempt to simu-
ltaneously consider the eﬀects of surveillance and
control on the transmission dynamics of nosocomial
infections. Surveillance plays two important roles
with respect to control. First, active surveillance al-
lows detection of infected (and possibly more im-
portantly asymptomatic, colonized) patients. This
identiﬁcation is necessary for targeted control that
curtails the infectious period (‘ isolation’). The second
role of surveillance is to estimate the burden of infec-
tion, which is essential if the success of any control
strategy is to be quantiﬁed.
Surveillance and control interaction
For many bacterial infections, the risk of disease (with
overt clinical symptoms) given infection/colonization
is small and dependent on other factors (e.g. surgical
wounds, catheterization, presence of intravenous de-
vices and antibiotic use). Consequently, monitoring
and controlling infection requires active surveillance
to detect individuals with asymptomatic carriage.
Inadequate surveillance causes any control strategy to
fail as too few infectious patients are isolated and
transmission is not suﬃciently reduced (i.e. R0 re-
mains >1). However, despite actually failing, the
control strategy can appear eﬀective since the appar-
ent prevalence is low due to the ineﬃciency of detec-
tion. The potential for misinterpretation lies in the
fact that a successful surveillance and control pro-
gramme would give exactly the same results in terms
of numbers detected. When infection is controlled the
apparent prevalence is low, not due to the inadequacy
of surveillance, but because it reﬂects real prevalence.
This ﬁnding is displayed in Figure 5(c, d ) where the
same apparent prevalence is seen for both low and
high detection eﬀorts.
The two screening strategies examined here display
diﬀerent control capabilities in an epidemic situation
simply due to the diﬀerences in detection capability.
With random screening, the apparent hospital preva-
lence reﬂects the real hospital prevalence consistently
for all real prevalence values, i.e. there is a linear re-
lationship (Fig. 3a). Therefore epidemics can be pre-
vented (by isolation) while infected numbers are still
low. The IW can cope with these small numbers of
detected patients and the epidemic can be controlled
before it becomes endemic. By contrast, screening on
admission means that apparent prevalence reﬂects
community prevalence accurately, but reﬂects real
hospital prevalence only when real prevalence levels
are high (i.e. when the hospital prevalence also reﬂects
community prevalence) (Fig. 3c, d ). Therefore the IW
is more likely to be overwhelmed and the control
strategy fail [19].
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Fig. 6. Diagrammatic representation of r0 and R0 values
given diﬀerent screening eﬀort levels. Thin lines denote
random screening and bold lines screening on admission.
The dotted lines show within-hospital r0 values, dashed and
dotted lines 1/(1 – Pk) values, and unbroken lines overall R0
values. Parameters used: initial r0=1.27, P=0.037, initial
R0=1.32, w=range 0–0.125, v=range 0–1.
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At the start of an epidemic, the majority of infec-
tions are amongst in-patients, so provided there is
isolation capacity, epidemics within the hospital are
controlled by random screening before they dis-
seminate into the community (Fig. 4g). Whereas,
screening on admission cannot detect infected
individuals in the hospital, who may be either (a)
readmissions of infected individuals from the
community (the probability of which increases as
the community prevalence increases) that remain
unscreened (with a probability of 1 – v) or (b) those
who have acquired MRSA whilst in hospital.
Therefore, these patients provide an unchecked
source of infection. Additionally, DNISO patients
are also a potential source on infection. With on-
admission screening, the number of DNISO patients
resembles the epidemic pattern seen in the community
because IW overﬂow is caused only by admitted
patients (i.e. from the community). As soon as the IW
becomes full it remains full, therefore all admitted,
screened patients move straight into this class.
Consequently, whatever the levels of infection look
like in the community, this pattern will be reﬂected in
the hospital.
Control of dissemination of MRSA throughout
the community requires eﬀective control of noso-
comial MRSA transmission [20] and, therefore, the
surveillance/control strategy adopted, whilst not
neglecting community eﬀects, should concentrate on
reducing hospital transmission. We believe this
implies that on-admission screening alone cannot be
used to control MRSA epidemics or any other infec-
tion which is driven by transmission between in-
patients. This would apply to the pending epidemics
of VRSA. However, on-admission screening may
play an important role in surveillance and control
of endemic infection (i.e. when it is well established
in the community) ; in particular it provides an
estimate of the infectious assault a hospital is
experiencing, community prevalence and past trans-
mission.
We have shown that screening in-patients ran-
domly provides the best information on hospital
prevalence (Fig. 3) and is most eﬀective at reducing
the rate of infection within the hospital (Fig. 6). In
contrast, screening on admission provides a better
approach to estimating community prevalence (Fig. 3)
but does not reduce within-hospital r0 ; therefore, the
overall R0 can only ever be reduced to the initial
within-hospital r0 value. As transmission is deter-
mined by the within-hospital reproduction number,
random screening becomes the more eﬀective strategy
overall.
Choosing a screening strategy
Hospital infection control is costly and despite some
evidence suggesting infection-related costs exceed
those of screening and control [4, 21–23], the costs
and beneﬁts associated with screening are largely un-
known. This may lead to reservations regarding
strategy implementation and so a greater under-
standing of the potential beneﬁts and pitfalls is clearly
needed.
Combination screening
It is likely that a combination of screening strategies is
desirable, reducing both hospital transmission and
infectious assault. Further research is required to de-
termine optimal combination strategies, within given
constraints (e.g. the number of patients that can be
screened per day), and dependent on given goals.
The community prevalence and pathogen transmiss-
ibility values will help determine the optimal combi-
nation, i.e. the optima will change for diﬀerent
epidemic/endemic situations. For example, if com-
munity prevalence is high and transmissibility low
then a reduction in R0 through screening on ad-
mission may be most eﬀective, but in a setting of low
community prevalence and high pathogen transmiss-
ibility then a reduction in within-hospital r0 would
probably be most beneﬁcial and, therefore, random
screening favoured.
Consideration of setting
All simulation results in this study are for speciﬁc R0
and r0 values, 1.32 and 1.27 respectively ; we believe
this situation is similar to those in most UK settings.
If other parameters had been chosen such that initial
r0 was<1 (i.e. insuﬃcient to allow an epidemic in the
hospital) but overall R0 was>1 then readmissions of
infected patients would be essential for MRSA en-
demicity so that screening on admission may be more
eﬀective. Further analytical investigation would allow
dependence of each strategies’ success/failure upon
parameter and r0 values to be determined.
Therefore, when considering how to deal with
potential epidemics, such as VRSA, factors such as
estimated reproduction numbers, hospital and com-
munity prevalences and readmission rates need to be
taken into account.
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A more targeted approach to targeted surveillance
Screening through routine clinical specimens has been
shown to be inadequate and an active screening pro-
gramme will generally be required to control MRSA
[24]. The random and on-admission strategies in-
cluded here are expensive and intensive. In reality
screening is likely to occur in a more targeted way, in
that certain criteria help determine which individuals
are to be screened. For example, van Saene et al. [25]
suggest only those at high risk should be targeted and
less eﬀort given to those where MRSA is unlikely to
increase mortality. Targeted screening to high-risk
groups alone has been shown to be eﬀective in a
number of studies [26, 27]. Other targeted approaches
include screening health-care workers to prevent
subsequent transmission to patients [28], and also so-
called ‘ring-fencing’ where screening is targeted to the
contacts of a known case [29].
A potential problem with these targeted methods
is that their failure may go unnoticed due to the
fact that those individuals who are not speciﬁcally
targeted may provide a reservoir of undetected infec-
tion. As no screening would occur for untargeted
individuals, no MRSA would ever be detected; how-
ever, this would not necessarily mean that MRSA was
not present, i.e. there may be large diﬀerences between
real and apparent prevalence. Thus, targeted methods
of screening, unless implemented carefully, may
lead to control failure. Randomly screening outside
the target group may be a way of overcoming this
problem.
Limitations of the model
The main limitations are due to the simpliﬁcation
of the system and the resulting reduction in hetero-
geneity.
As homogeneity is assumed, and no patient is more
or less likely to transmit or contract MRSA than any
other, the eﬀects of targeted screening, for example of
high-risk groups or health-care workers, cannot be
explored. For example, it may be a hospital’s policy to
screen all patients going into an intensive care unit
[30] but not for other wards. Our simple average
screening rate is inadequate to determine the impact
that this selective screening may have on transmission
dynamics. Heterogeneity in patient susceptibility (to
infection and disease) is also missing. Additionally,
the assumption that the rate of discharge is equal for
all hospital subgroups ignores a particular feature
of MRSA: it increases length of stay. Perhaps most
importantly, we do not include heterogeneity in
patient contact rates, other than to assume that
recently discharged patients have a higher rate of
readmission. For example, the possibility that pro-
longed length of stay and/or infection with MRSA
(as well as other factors such as age) might increase
the readmission rate is not included. It is likely
that the ‘mixing’ of patients and staﬀ will have
important impacts on the transmission dynamics,
especially when considering multiple health-care
facilities with a single community reservoir. Move-
ments of individuals (particularly persistent carriers)
between hospitals, long-term care facilities and com-
munity populations need to be included in order
to model MRSA transmission dynamics eﬀectively
[31, 32].
It must be borne in mind that this model is not
meant to be used as a forecasting tool but rather to
give an indication of factors that would contribute
to a successful control strategy and to force a theor-
etical framework to be established and thus complex
relationships to be brought down to their simplest
form. This requires an understanding of underlying
processes involved [13] and helps to identify areas in
which more precise information is needed [11].
CONCLUSIONS
Surveillance is essential to infection control and the
particular surveillance strategy adopted can dramati-
cally alter the eﬀectiveness of this control. Given
exactly the same control strategy and setting, one
surveillance strategy may allow a particular control
method to work and prevent spread, whilst another
may cause it to fail and an epidemic to ensue.
We found screening randomly within the hospital
to be an eﬀective strategy for hospital surveillance
and screening on admission to be eﬀective at com-
munity surveillance. Additionally we found noso-
comial control, brought about by eﬀective hospital
surveillance, also prevented epidemic behaviour in the
community. Thus making random screening the more
eﬀective strategy overall for the parameter values
chosen.
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